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ABSTRACT
Financial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic
sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions.
This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to interpret the Basel
Accords as a framework for endlessly renegotiating minimal duties and standards of safety-net management
across the community of nations. Modelling the stakes and stakeholders represented by different regulators
helps us to understand that inconsistencies exist in prior understandings about the range of sectoral
effects that the 2004 Basel II agreement might produce. The analysis seeks to explain why, in the U.S.,
attempting to resolve these inconsistencies has spawned an embarrassingly fractious debate and repeatedly
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BASEL II: A CONTRACTING PERSPECTIVE
* 
 
  This paper uses the concepts of regulatory arbitrage, sequential decision-making, and 
incomplete contracting to explain why Basel II has so many loose ends and why U.S. efforts 
to implement Basel II have been roiled by controversy and delays. Perceived as a forum for 
reregulation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) enlists supervisory 
authorities (“regulators”) from financial-center countries to work together to control 
regulatory arbitrage and to promote financial integration and better risk management (Barr 
and Miller, 2006; Pattison, 2006). But the success of BCBS negotiations is limited by the 
largely nonbinding nature of the agreements its members ratify and by divergences in the 
interests and political clout of the economic sectors BCBS conferees represent. 
  For this reason, the original 1988 BCBS Accord (Basel I) and its successor Accord 
(Basel II) are better viewed as a collection of strategic guidelines than as systems of rules. The 
agreements neither spell out explicitly the quasi-fiduciary duties that banking regulators owe 
to their counterparts in other countries nor explain how such duties are to be enforced when 
they conflict with the interests of stakeholders to whom they are politically accountable.  
__________________________ 
*For valuable comments, the author is indebted to Richard C. Aspinwall, Rosalind Bennett, Fred Furlong, Gillian 
Garcia, Richard Herring, Paul Horvitz, George Kaufman, John Krainer, Paul Kupiec, Geoffrey Miller, James 
Moser, John Pattison, Haluk Unal, an anonymous referee, and participants in research colloquia at Boston 
College, York University, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and International Atlantic Economic Society Meetings in Madrid.  
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  BCBS negotiations are founded on the premise that group expressions of regulatory 
intentions are something more than cheap talk. How much more is unclear. The Accord fails 
to include clauses that could make regulators in individual countries directly accountable to 
one another for enforcing the standards the BCBS promulgates. Additional weaknesses exist 
both in the methods used to test Basel II arrangements for their effects on the cross-country 
and within-country distributions of financial-institution risk and regulatory capital and in the 
methods that were originally used to set the 4-percent and 8-percent capital standards. 
  Section I underscores the nontransparency of pre-Basel and post-Basel dealmaking 
between governmental and industry stakeholders in individual countries (on the one hand) and 
the negotiating teams that participated directly in the Basel contracting process (on the other). 
The analysis demonstrates how a contracting perspective can help us to understand the 
protracted, sequential, and sometimes waspish nature of Basel-related negotiations and the 
gaps in regulatory accountability the Accord deliberately embraces.    
  Prior to letting agents undertake cross-country negotiations, it is optimal for interested 
economic sectors in each country --as principals-- to exchange understandings with their 
particular negotiating team. Each understanding is meant to constrain the concessions that the 
particular sector may be asked to absorb. Because inconsistencies in sectoral understandings 
are unavoidable, individual-country negotiators must insist that cross-country agreements 
incorporate design options (called “national adaptions and concretions” by Kette, 2006) that 
leave contract terms incomplete. National regulators need these options to placate principals 
that might feel short-changed (or even betrayed) by the international agreement. The hope is 
that these options can be employed to craft subdeals that are mutually acceptable to 
competing interests in their home counties.    4
  Section II describes the major options conveyed to banks and regulators by the Basel 
II agreement. Although negotiators prefer not to acknowledge this, adherence to cross-country 
guidelines will be tempered by the force of contrary domestic pressures and by the severity of 
financial troubles that different economies experience. Government responses to political and 
crisis pressures in the past indicate that clientele, career, and bureaucratic interests tend to 
outweigh international considerations.  In tough times, whatever concern individual regulators 
might have for preserving or enhancing their standing within the international regulatory 
community (emphasized, e.g., in Whitehead, 2006) will not matter very much. 
  Section III proposes a simplified nonmathematical model that can explain how 
inconsistencies in the predeal understandings and goals of interested domestic parties 
poisoned post-Basel bargaining in the United States. Section IV identifies some possible paths 
for resolving contradictory concerns. The path of least resistance may be for regulators to 
abandon the link between reductions in regulatory capital and the extent to which an 
institution actually improves its risk management.   
 
I. Viewing the Basel Accord as an Incomplete Multilevel Contract 
  The fairness and efficiency of the explicit terms of the contract (or “deal”) constructed 
in Basel fall short of the Basel Committee’s stated goals of promoting comprehensive risk 
management and consistency in international regulatory standards. However, just as our view 
of a forest might be blocked by its trees, the redeeming social value of Basel negotiations as a 
multilevel and intertemporal strategy-making process can be obscured by focusing only on 
difficulties observed in particular outcomes.    5
  Marking off particular sequences of negotiations and assigning them a discrete numeral 
misses the essential continuity and inconclusiveness of the patch-by-patch contracting process. 
This paper conceives of negotiation outcomes at any date T as “Basel (T)”: the value of an 
integral equation whose kernel “B(t)dt” is driven by the goals that stakeholders (Sik) in each of 
m different countries(k = 1, …, m) hope to achieve and the resources (Rik) they plan to invest in 
lobbying for these goals.  
  Figure 1 identifies the so-called “pillars” of the Basel II Accord. Although the diagram 
depicts the pillars to be of equal height and thickness, especially with respect to risks (such as 
interest-rate risk in the banking book) that are not part of Pillar 1, the second and third pillars 
have been hollowed out by lobbying efforts and may not support much weight. Until and 
unless the incentives of banks and regulators are better aligned with those of ordinary citizens, 
Pillar 2 options may be too feeble, too opaque, and too riddled with conflict from regulatory 
competition to provide reliable reinforcement for the other pillars.  
  It is important to recognize that Basel II asks rather than forces national regulators to 
behave in globally appropriate ways. Realistically, it frames a renegotiation game that binds 
officials only to monitor and to think about the global consequences of actions taken by the 
institutions they regulate. The outcome of this game is apt to prove more favorable for some 
countries than for others.  
 As  mutable  multinational  agreements, the contracts the BCBS writes establish an 
intertemporal structure within which to renegotiate complicated multiparty relationships. 
They are not treaties because signatories represent regulatory agencies rather than sovereign 
governments. Individual negotiators and the people they report to are short-lived agents for 
numerous long-lived principals. The principals are constituencies that are modelled here as   6
concerned sectors of each agent’s home economy.  Each tentative contract that agents 
consider in Basel promises to pass a series of rights and obligations through to the 
negotiators’ home constituencies. 
  Within a country’s government, financial regulators are expected simultaneously to 
supervise and to represent conflicting constituencies. Contracting theory presupposes that 
costs of reading and writing contracts are minimized. To minimize the total costs of 
negotiating with foreign and domestic constituencies, Basel II negotiations proceed in three 
phases. Prior to conducting dealmaking sessions in Basel, each negotiator must prenegotiate 
hard and soft constraints on its ability to accept deals that might disadvantage its politically 
powerful domestic principals. It is useful to think of these restrictions as predeal 
understandings. An understanding is neither as sharply worded nor as enforceable as a formal 
contract. To the extent that understandings are not made public, particular constituencies can 
interpret their understandings in ways that might well be inconsistent with understandings 
furnished to one or more other sectors. Moreover, as parties with a personal and 
organizational interest in the game, negotiators may find it advantageous on key issues to 
accept soft constraints that they subsequently plan to violate.  
  Each time cross-country negotiators adjust the system’s strategic guidelines to meet 
objections raised by agents for particular constituencies, negotiators returning from Basel 
have to describe changes in the cross-country deal and reconcile them with prior 
understandings. Third-phase recontracting occurs separately with other concerned officials 
within a given government and with interested sectoral constituencies. In this phase, 
negotiators are apt to paint their need to renege on predeal agreements as if they were   7
necessitated by what they learned in Basel about the constraints faced or imposed by foreign 
negotiators.  
  Tables 1 and 2 model the Accord’s main stakeholders in the U.S. and Europe, 
respectively. Table 3 models the stakes.  
  Within countries, financial institutions hoped that Basel II would redistribute safety-
net costs and benefits among competing governmental and sectoral interests in advantageous 
ways. For U.S. regulators, the stated purpose of the negotiations was to enhance financial 
stability. As the negotiations wore on, negotiators from the European Union seemed more 
interested in using Basel II to promote regulatory integration. The European Parliament 
apparently wanted to establish a uniform framework for internationally active European 
banking groups without burdening regional banks operating mainly in national markets.  
   Like bodily health, stability cannot be traded from one party to another. It is what 
Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) characterize as an “undescribable” 
variable. Negotiators assume stability can be proxied and that the proxy can be defined as the 
absence of worrisome forms of financial disorder. More concretely, Basel II presupposes that 
changes in stability can be represented by obverse movements in the probability and loss 
severity of the particular disorders (such as economic insolvencies and operational 
breakdowns) that adjustments in the Accord seek to hold at bay. Implicitly, every draft of the 
Basel Accord embodies a projection of how selected control variables (especially variously 
defined capital ratios) affect the components of a larger-dimensional space of global welfare. 
The implicit projection that Basel II will reduce individual-bank or systemic risks is largely 
hypothetical. Empirical support consists mainly of qualitative inferences about how widely 
recognized forms of risk-taking, risk transfer, and risk support undertaken by individual   8
financial institutions or their regulators ought in theory to affect a subset of default 
probabilities and loss severities in question.  
 
Incompleteness 
  In a world of changing governments, it is impossible for one generation of regulators 
to craft a contract that can firmly precommit their successors. In a world of changing financial 
technology, the list of contractable triggers of instability can never be completely described. 
For both reasons, explicit contractual rights and duties must have slack built into them. In 
principle, the loose ends are intended to allow individual-country regulators enough flexibility 
to expand their catalogue of approved and disapproved behaviors over time as unforseeable 
circumstances dictate. In practice, loose ends are reciprocal options that allow safety-net 
subsidies to be distributed nontransparently to private financial interests.  
  From this practical point of view, the most disturbing loose ends concern Basel II’s 
treatment of large and complex banking organizations. Regulators need the vision to see 
through the accounting numbers to the true condition of the institutions they supervise and the 
incentives to respond appropriately to what they see. A bank’s opacity, political clout, and 
organizational ability to arbitrage regulatory systems increase both with its size and with its 
complexity. Even within countries,  clever rogues or desperate managers can book particular 
loss exposures in ways that are too opaque for regulators to monitor and discipline them 
effectively.  It is possible that data-collection and risk-measurement standards under Basel II 
are so loosely specified that close adherence to them in making business decisions can support 
an increase rather than a decrease in insolvency risk at many banks. To lessen this danger, 
capital requirements under Basel II ought to incorporate a measure of opacity and impose an   9
additional opacity-related capital requirement to account for the opportunties that large and 
complex banks have to relocate exposures across instruments and borders to avoid detection 
and/or to lessen their exposure to Pillar 2 discipline.   
  A good contract is easy to understand and creates incentives for its fulfillment. From 
the perspective of the individual constituencies, hard-to-decode loose ends are options that 
can be characterized as opportunities for regulators to renegotiate or reinterpret the agreement 
when unforeseen or unspecified contingencies arise (Ben-Shahar, 2004; Foss, 1996).  
Retaining flexibility is a good thing, but granting flexibility to a contractual counterparty 
authorizes it to act adversely to one’s interests. No matter how well-intentioned, any contract 
as complex as Basel II must be feared (Rasmussen, 1996). The remedies for this fear are trust 
and independent analytic ability, but neither of these remedies is costless for an individual 
agent or stakeholder to establish.  
  An agent builds trust by making itself accountable for results. An agent builds 
accountability (A) in three ways: by making its actions and motives transparent, by bonding 
its commitment to the principal’s interests, and by giving the principal the power to deter 
opportunistic behavior. Bonus clauses and reputational costs are forms of bonding. An 
opportunistic agent’s exposure to retribution from the principal has a deterrent effect.   
  For every stakeholder (Sj, j = 1, …, n), the value of each imbedded option k (Ojk, k = 
1, …, mj) depends on the degree to which stakeholder j can reasonably trust the option’s 
counterparties to behave competently and nonopportunistically. At Basel, agents failed to 
bond the Pillar II activities of foreign regulators to the goal of financial stability or to 
negotiate the kinds of inter-regulator and public disclosures that would reliably buttress 
market discipline by allowing independent experts to assess the quality of Pillar II activity.    10
  U.S. negotiating teams are not personally accountable to voter-taxpayers for these 
omissions. Members were allowed to renegotiate Basel I without direct Congressional 
involvement or approval. What accountability exists comes nontransparently from post-Basel 
negotiations with other U.S. regulators and industry groups. Ironically, these groups’ ability to 
win new concessions traces to their option to lobby Congressional committees to weigh in on 
their side.  













j m  
1 k jk O j O  are unlikely to be fully counterbalanced by the value of 
the net benefits or burdens conveyed by the explicit and enforceable terms of the contract (Bj). 
This is because involved sectors that see the deal as exposing them to harm have a strong 
incentive to hold up --or even to blow up-- the deal.  
 
II. Options Conveyed to Banks and Regulators by Basel II 
  Prudential regulation of financial institutions seeks to balance the social costs and 
benefits of individual-country safety nets. Both Basel Accords recognize the possibility that 
the cross-country operations of aggressive multinational banks or opportunistic interventions 
by their regulators can upset this balance.  
  Government intervention in finance leads to a protracted series of collisions between 
political and economic forces (Kane, 1981 and 1984). Basel II represents the third stage in a 
dialectical sequence of regulation, burden avoidance, and eventual re-regulation. The patterns 
of the regulatory arbitrage and response that Basel I induced are unusual in three ways. First, 
almost all banks have chosen to hold capital positions that are greatly in excess of minimum   11
standards and want to continue to advertise themselves that way. Second, any bank that found 
the minimum standards burdensome could almost costlessly close the gap by securitizing low-
risk loans and thereby increase its portfolio risk to raise its desired level of capital to the 
regulatory minimum. Third, around the world, banks and regulators support the effort to 
narrow this loophole by increasing the granularity of the risk categories used in setting capital 
standards.   
  Besides increasing the number of risk categories, Basel II proposes to use a mix of 
statistical methods and expert opinion to track a bank’s changing exposure to insolvency risk 
over time. It also envisions improved disclosure as a way to generate complementary market 
discipline on bank capital positions. However, Basel II does not improve on Basel I either in 
how it measures capital or in the arbitrary target ratios it sets. 
  Although influenced by prior consultation with other stakeholders, the June 2004 
agreement known as Basel II reflects direct bargaining only among members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Basel II leaves a number of options open for 
regulators in individual countries to use in renegotiating prior understandings among 
themselves and with various client institutions.  
  Basel II is not easy to understand and promises to generate options that have 
undesirable incentive effects. It grants national regulators an option to use any (or all) of three 
different schemes to determine the regulatory capital of client banks [see Kupiec (2005 and 
2006), Pennachi (2005), U.S. Comptroller of the Currency et al. (2006), and Viets (2006) for 
details]. In turn, where a country authorizes more than one scheme, some or all banks receive 
the option to adopt whatever scheme they find most beneficial (or least burdensome) and to 
implement the scheme they choose in the most advantageous way. By exercising their options   12
optimally, similarly situated banks in the same country or in different countries could end up 
with widely divergent levels of required capital. Indeed, this is what the five Quantitative 
Impact Studies (QIS1 to QIS5) conducted under the aegis of the BCBS have shown (Kupiec, 
2006).  
  The most important option concerns whether or not to use an Internal-Ratings-Based 
(IRB) Approach or the Standardized Approach to determine an individual bank’s capital 
requirement. The simpler Standardized Approach resembles Basel I, except that it 
incorporates a wider range of weights and asks countries to choose a set of external rating 
agencies and use these agencies’ assessments of risk to determine country-level capital 
requirements. IRB Approaches allow banks to specify and submit for validation their own 
“internal” models to calibrate their exposure to insolvency risk. Basel II distinguishes the so-
called Foundation IRB (FIRB) model from the Advanced IRB (AIRB) model for constructing 
these estimates and calculating minimum capital requirements. For each individual credit, 
both models require banks to specify a probability of default (PD), a “loss given default” 
(LGD), and an expected exposure at default (EAD). The FIRB approach differs from the 
AIRB in specifying rules for calculating EAD and in using a single LGD for all of a bank’s 
credits. In calculating EAD, FIRB ignores the possibility that the rate of credit-line drawdown 
and borrower PD are likely to be driven by common factors (Kupiec, 2007).  
  The internally generated data are plugged into a correlation function based on 
characteristics of each credit and then passed through a model that ultimately produces a 
probability distribution of potential losses over the next year. Minimum regulatory capital is 
determined by the requirement that the bank must be able to absorb all but the last 0.1 percent 
tail of losses displayed by this synthetic distribution. How artfully a bank parametizes this   13
distribution is difficult to constrain. Because capital is costly, savvy regulators expect that 
most banks will use legitimate reporting options to understate their true loss exposure to some 
degree. Ideally, regulatory protocols for validating models under the AIRB ought to focus on 
estimating how fast the uncovered tail of the true loss distribution might grow when and as 
various circumstances cause a bank’s economic capital to decline (Kane, 2006). 
 
III. A Non-Mathematical Model of Post-Basel Contracting in the United States 
  It is convenient to define I j as the information and expertise needed to evaluate 
accurately the option values Oj and net contractual benefit or burden Bj stakeholder j faces 
from a proposed deal. Gaps can exist betweenI j and the information and expertise Ij that 
constituency j or its agent aj actually possesses. When these gaps are not fully appreciated by 
a constituency or its agent(s), it is unlikely that its interests will be adequately safeguarded. 
Rationally, constituencies that simultaneously do not trust their agents to represent their 
interests energetically and have enough information to perceive adverse movements in their 
stake in the Accord should exert pressure to prolong the deal-making until one or the other 
condition can be repaired.  
  To understand post-Basel developments in the U.S., it is helpful to construct a model. 
My model supposes that in each participating country (q = 1,…, Q), national regulators are 
agents whose respective objective functions Wq combines welfare from four sources:  
 1.  Personal rewards to leaders (pq);  
  2. Bureaucratic benefits obtained for their particular organization through     
      regulatory competition (bq); 
  3. Benefits generated for client financial institutions (fq);   14
  4. Mission-driven safety-net benefits that flow through to the representative voter-    
     taxpayer vq).    
  Post-Basel bargaining occurs both between U.S. agents and between every agent and 
its principals. Although all four federal deposit-institution regulators participated in Basel II 
discussions, the New York Fed and the Board of Governors exercised a commanding 
leadership role. The Fed’s leadership role among central banks was inherited from Basel I and 
adversely affects its ability in the post-Basel process to treat other U.S. regulators as equal 
participants. In Basel, the Board and New York have always had separate votes in the 
negotiations. Moreover, when Basel II discussions began, sister central banks occupied most 
of the seats at the BCBS table. As supervisory functions began to be split off from European 
central banks, the new supervisory agencies were incorporated into the negotiation process, 
but no central bank surrendered its place in the process.  
  For modeling purposes, it is convenient to assume that Fed employees negotiated the 
U.S. position in Basel, but now must negotiate implementation issues with other U.S. 
financial regulators taken as a group. I call the collective group the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Plus (FDIC+) because I assume that these regulators’ twofold concern in post-
Basel negotiations is to defend the interests of their particular regulatory clienteles and to 
protect the deposit-insurance fund against the possibility that large banks might be able to 
operate in a low capital position.  
  For simplicity, I assume that Fed personnel focus on maintaining their employer’s 
position of global leadership with foreign regulators and its reputation for supporting financial 
innovation with large financial holding companies. Table 1 lays out how the FDIC+ members 
channel the interests of other depository institutions.    15
  I also assume that Congress and the Administration project that, over their expected 
terms in office, voter-taxpayers are prepared to trust financial-institution regulators until and 
unless either they create a public controversy or systemic financial problems emerge. If either 
event occurs, elected politicians plan to jump in and mete out blame.  
 To  maintain  their  capacity for shifting blame, politicians will accept any system on 
which the Fed and the FDIC+ can agree, but any regulator or any industry segment can 
persuade politicians and voters to examine and defend their stakes in the outcome if 
negotiations proceed badly enough for their side.
1 Finally, I assume that, because of its less-
elitist clientele and minimal contact with foreign regulators, the bureaucratic costs of 
exercising this or other hold-up threats is much less for members of the FDIC+ than for the 
Fed. 
Incentive Conflicts in Post-Basel Negotiations 
  Conflicts between the social missions of regulators and the interests of the sectors they 
regulate cannot be avoided. Post-Basel negotiations must resolve not only these conflicts, but 
also conflicts among the missions and clienteles assigned to different regulators. 
  The interests of the nation’s largest institutions in inter-regulator negotiations are also 
conflicted. On the one hand, standards that would be tough enough to assure financial stability 
would help large banks by lessening the expected value of the FDIC’s right to levy ex post 
assessments to finance losses that exceed the value of the FDIC’s insurance fund. On the 
other hand, they want to compete as strongly as possible with foreign institutions. Figure 3 
illustrates that the very largest institutions may reasonably think of themselves as too big to 
                                                 
1 House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank was quoted in a February 20, 2007 Amercian 
Banker column on “Washington People” as saying: “My basic concern [about the Basel process] is that I have to 
pay attention to it and it gives me a headache. It’s Rubik’s cube – every time you do one thing, six other people 
get upset.”    16
fail and unwind. In this case, they should resist standards tough enough to preclude them from 
pursuing heavy tail risks that extract government-contributed capital from the safety net. 
  Neither Basel II nor U.S. regulatory protocols include specific plans for resolving 
large multinational financial organizations.  The obvious opportunities for risk-shifting that 
this gap in planning poses leads me to infer that the nation’s largest banks do not want a 
benchmark resolution protocol to be designed and tested. As a group, they may believe that an 
unstructured environment would enhance their ability to lobby for forbearances and/or to 
negotiate away their assessment exposure if a large bank were actually to become insolvent.  
This hypothesis can explain why large U.S. institutions continue to lobby uniformly for 
further capital relief.   
  At each agency, the vast majority of employees are involved in supervising and 
servicing their clienteles. This creates a bureaucratic interest in preserving the size and 
competitive positions of their clientele. At the same time, no member of the FDIC+ 
community would like to test the system’s ability to resolve the insolvency of a giant firm. 
For both reasons, these agencies are bound to oppose adjustments that promise to increase the 
probability that a large institution might become economically insolvent.    
  Policymakers agreed at the outset that their goal was to improve risk management at 
large banks, not to help banks to operate with markedly lower levels of capital. In the predeal 
phase, U.S. regulators agreed publicly that very large U.S. banks
2 would be required to use 
whatever version of the Advanced IRB approach (AIRBus) regulators finally authorize. Other 
U.S. institutions could choose, but only between the AIRBus and a Standardized approach. 
                                                 
2 The mandate applies to banks or thrifts that have either $250 billion in total assets or $10 billion in assets held 
abroad.  
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The second part of the understanding among regulators was that the overall level of U.S. bank 
capital would not be allowed to decrease much under Basel II. “Much” is of course a word 
that could be interpreted differently by different constituencies. Behind this understanding lay 
regulators’ statutory duty under the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 to define a series of 
leverage-ratio triggers for Prompt Corrective action (PCA) intervention that are tough enough 
and transparent enough to make authorities accountable ex post for losses suffered by the 
federal insurance fund.  FDICIA designates an unweighted leverage ratio of two percent as 
the threshold at which an undercapitalized bank that does not promptly recapitalize itself must 
surrender its charter.  However, the numerical value or accounting tripwires that require lesser 
interventions are set by interagency agreement.  
  Perhaps because they fear that PCA requirements impinge on Fed independence, 
Federal Reserve personnel often mischaracterize regulatory concern for the leverage ratio as a 
transitional safeguard meant to “backstop” Basel protocols for banks whose information or 
control systems might initially mishandle the complicated AIRB capital calibration. However, 
Congress and the FDIC+ recognize that simplicity and transparency of the leverage ratio 
creates the personal and bureaucratic accountability that ultimately enables PCA requirements 
to restrain capital forbearance.  
  PCA obligations and the second understanding undermined predeal assurances 
afforded the banking industry that individual banks that designed and operated state-of-the-art 
risk-management systems would be rewarded with reduced levels of regulatory capital. In an 
offhand effort to sort out the conflict in understandings, one Fed Governor – Governor Susan 
Schmidt Bies – was quoted as saying, “The leverage ratio down the road has got to   18
disappear.” This was good news for large institutions, because the disappearance of leverage-
ratio triggers is a development they favor.  
  However, the length of this road was noticeably extended by the outcome of the fourth 
Quantitative Impact Study (QIS4). As Figure 2 shows, QIS4 indicated that if the 26 bank 
holding companies surveyed met only AIRB-generated requirements, 17 of them would show 
a leverage ratio that PCA standards would classify as undercapitalized. 
  This result was both surprising and disturbing. It was surprising in that it seems as if 
the quantitative staffs at these 17 giant holding companies used QIS4 survey instruments to 
demonstrate to their superiors how effectively Basel II would let them arbitrage restrictions on 
leverage without stopping to appreciate the parallel danger of demonstrating this same 
capacity to regulators in other industry segments. The outcome was disturbing in two ways. 
First, it supports the hypothesis that quantitative personnel at large banks and the Fed have 
been the engine driving the Basel II train in the U.S. and that disconnects exist in the way 
members of this staff interface with the rest of their organization. Second, neither the 
competitive upheaval nor the threat to the deposit-insurance fund that these results implied 
was sustainable politically. Smaller members of the FDIC+ clienteles demanded that the 
formulas embodied in the Standardized Approach be recalibrated to afford them equal capital 
relief, whether or not they did anything to improve their risk management. This scaled-down 
capital standard has come to be known as “Basel IA.”  
 
IV. Where Can Regulators Go From Here?  
  In September 2005, the Fed and the FDIC+ took the first step in the post-Basel process 
of formally reconciling inconsistent understandings about bank prospects for capital   19
reduction. Regulators agreed that, during the first three years of implementation, no individual 
bank’s Basel II capital would be allowed to drop more than 5 percent a year, relative to pre-
Basel II standards. In March 2006, U.S. regulators indicated [and in September 2006 stated in 
a massive notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR)] that if aggregate capital held by AIRB banks 
fell by 10 percent, they reserved the right to redesign the AIRB system. Because QIS4 tells us 
that this so-called “transition floor” might be hit in the second year, a 10-percent reduction is 
likely to be the recalibration target for which large banks and FDIC+ clienteles will lobby.  
  This rewriting of predeal understandings not only reduces projected returns at large 
banks and thrifts, it leaves the entire industry less trustful of the options they are likely to 
enjoy under the still-evolving regulatory system. All parties are annoyed that the time and 
resources invested in supervisory negotiations and bank measurement systems have not yet 
produced a workable arrangement. Undoubtedly, large-bank investments in risk-management 
systems promise a mix of regulatory and nonregulatory benefits -- not just regulatory ones. 
However, divergences between the AIRB model and a large bank’s own risk-measurement 
protocols create deadweight costs. Compliance costs could be greatly reduced by monitoring 
and frequently revalidating the internal models each large bank uses, while allowing large 
banks’ formal capital requirements to be set by the standardized approach.  
  In July 2006, four giant institutions -- Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wachovia, and 
Washington Mutual – openly asked to renegotiate their stake by requesting that large U.S. 
banks be granted the option either to help design improved AIRB formulas or to use 
something like the Standardized approach that competing European banks enjoy. On August 
3, the American Bankers Association sent a letter to Dr. Bernanke and leaders of the FDIC+   20
asking “the agencies to permit U.S. banking organizations of all sizes the option of adopting 
alternative methodologies.”  
  While Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke previously dismissed this option, large 
banks and FDIC Chairman Bair are challenging his answer.  To get large banks back on the 
train, the Fed may have to postpone the AIRB mandate and can justify this as buying time to 
incorporate and test “promising” new advances in risk modeling. In a February 2007 
comment on the 2006 NPR, the four banks attacked the transition floors and the relevance and 
validity of the QIS4 data that spawned them. The banks also reasserted their claim that the 
provisions officials agreed to add to Basel II convey unfair competitive advantages to foreign 
banks.
3 Since other U.S. regulators are in no hurry to adopt Basel II in any case, the main 
costs of temporarily making AIRB optional would be a slight loss of face in the international 
regulatory community for the Fed and for individual personnel most closely identified with 
implementing the 2004 agreement. Finally, the four banks’ February 2007 comment asks that 
level and composition of the leverage ratio be reviewed.  
  To maintain financial stability, the choice of PCA triggers must feature the idea that a 
sustained decline in the accounting value of capital is a lagging indicator of bank weakness. 
Other nonnegotiable points should be to continue to make tough and transparent leverage-
ratio thresholds the key to identifying failing and zombie firms and to continue to give these 
thresholds incentive force by mandating that every agency’s Inspector General conduct a 
thorough “material loss review” whenever an institution it supervises imposes a substantial 
loss on the insurance fund. A conscientious material loss review publicly unveils a failed 
institution’s supervisory history in excruciating detail. The credible threat of ex post 
                                                 
3 If true, the fault lies either in the procedures used to validate IRB models in particular countries or in the 
absence of PCA requirements from Basel II (Nieto and Wall, 2006). It is instructive to note that European banks 
routinely express the opposite fear.    21
accountability for imprudent forbearances fuels the incentive force that supervisors feel from 
PCA standards.  
  A dangerous path on which regulators might embark would be to surrender control of 
the inevitably politicized capital-assessment process in the hope that, in the not-too-distant 
future, transparent and reliable statistical methods for objectively measuring risk exposure 
will emerge. It might seem defensible to measure risk exclusively by IRB procedures at 
strongly capitalized banks if the Basel approach to risk-weighting were made truly 
comprehensive, but measuring bank risk is not the role that the leverage ratio plays in PCA. 
However, Basel protocols will always contain loopholes. It is no accident that regulatory 
forbearance can gain cover from Pillar I’s neglect of the concealment options created by the 
complexity of a bank’s balance sheet and of exposures to interest-rate risk in its banking 
book. Hence, even if regulators could take account of all of a bank’s loss exposures, it would 
still be necessary to counter nontransparencies in the forbearance pressures that agencies 
might experience. For this reason, taxpayers need the simpler tests embodied in PCA 
thresholds to trigger reliable end-game regulatory discipline.  
  Whatever regulators decide about risk weighting, to strengthen leverage-ratio triggers 
for troubled banks, they ought also to tighten their definition of capital  to incorporate market-
value losses. Consistent with evidence presented by Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000), 
leverage-ratio supervisory triggers would be improved if accountants were required to define 
contra-asset loan-loss reserves as the higher of either: (1) incentive-conflicted estimates now 
routinely prepared by bank personnel or (2) estimates generated by a rolling-regression model 
that agency researchers would update and apply each quarter.    22
  Politically, the path of least resistance appears to be a different one: to focus post-
Basel negotiations on lowering minimum regulatory capital in a way that equalizes the 
competitive effects of capital-requirement reductions across regulatory clienteles. In this case, 
rather than being designed to provide a better measure of risk sensitivity and to reward 
improvements in risk management made by individual institutions, I would bet that capital 
requirements finally specified in Basel IA for community banks and in options that might be 
opened for large banks would each be calibrated to reduce regulatory capital to a level 
approaching the U.S. regulators’ previously specified 10 percent transition floor. If political 
pressures force the FDIC to accept this outcome for minimum capital, I would urge the FDIC 
to use its authority to raise explicit deposit insurance premiums as a bargaining chip with 
which to persuade the other agencies to toughen the definitions and levels of capital that 
trigger prompt corrective action obligtations.   23
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Appendix 
 
Fact sheet - Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Functions  
The Committee provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. 
Over recent years, it has developed increasingly into a standard-setting body on all 
aspects of banking supervision.  
Membership  
Senior officials responsible for banking supervision or financial stability issues in central 
banks and authorities with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking 
business where this is not the central bank.  
Institutions 
National Bank of Belgium  Banking and Finance and Insurance 
Commission 
Bank of Canada   Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions 
Bank of France   General Secretariat of the Banking 
Commission 
Deutsche Bundesbank   Federal Financial Services Agency 
Bank of Italy   
Bank of Japan   Financial Services Agency 
Surveillance Commission for the Financial 
Sector (Luxembourg) 
 
Netherlands Bank   
Bank of Spain   
Sveriges Riksbank   Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority 
Swiss National Bank   Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
Bank of England   Financial Services Authority 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System  
Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency  
  Federal Reserve Bank of New York   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Chairman  
Nout Wellink, President of the Netherlands Bank.    26
Vice Chairman: Nicholas LePan, Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada.  
Secretariat  
Secretary General (as from 4 September 2006: Stefan Walter), supported by a staff of 14.  
Frequency of meetings  
The Basel Committee usually meets four times per year.  
Reporting arrangements  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reports to a joint committee of central 
bank Governors and (non-central bank) heads of supervision from the G10 countries.  
Outreach  
The Committee maintains links with supervisors not directly participating in the 
committee with a view to strengthening prudential supervisory standards in all the major 
markets. These efforts take a number of different forms, including:  
•  the development and dissemination throughout the world of policy papers on a 
wide range of supervisory matters;  
•  the pursuit of supervisory cooperation through support for regional supervisory 
committees and sponsorship of an international conference every two years;  
•  cooperation with the FSI in providing supervisory training both in Basel and at 
regional or local level. 
Main subgroups  
•  Accord Implementation Group 
•  Capital Task Force 
•  Accounting Task Force 
•  Core Principle Liaison Group 
•  Cross Border Banking Group 
•  Research Task Force 
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GIANT BANKS NEED LESS 
ENTERPRISE-CONTRIBUTED CAPTIAL
Moody’s now assesses U.S. banks’ likelihood of 
getting “systemic support” when needed.  






Model of U.S. Stakeholders and Clienteles Model of U.S. Stakeholders and Clienteles
I. Federal Reserve Board and NY Fed (lead negotiators for the U. I. Federal Reserve Board and NY Fed (lead negotiators for the U.S.) S.)
a.  Quantitative Staff at Fed (stake = advancement &  a.  Quantitative Staff at Fed (stake = advancement & “ “street  street creds creds” ”: e.g., John Mingo) : e.g., John Mingo)
b. Successive Leaders of Basel II push b. Successive Leaders of Basel II push
• • Early leaders: William McDonough and Larry Meyer Early leaders: William McDonough and Larry Meyer
• • Successors: Roger Ferguson, Susan  Successors: Roger Ferguson, Susan Bies Bies, and Randy  , and Randy Kroszner Kroszner
c.  c. Broad Stability Mission Broad Stability Mission: Stabilize Liquidity; Oversee Domestic and International  : Stabilize Liquidity; Oversee Domestic and International 
Value of the Dollar; Promote Systemic Stability Value of the Dollar; Promote Systemic Stability
d.  d. Special Clientele Special Clientele: Larger Financial Holding Cos. and Their Quant. Staffs : Larger Financial Holding Cos. and Their Quant. Staffs
II. Other Federal Regulators: The FDIC+  II. Other Federal Regulators: The FDIC+ 
a. FDIC a. FDIC
Mission Mission: Resolve Insolvencies and Protect the Integrity of the DI fund. : Resolve Insolvencies and Protect the Integrity of the DI fund.
Special Clientele Special Clientele: Community Banks; Conference of State Bank Supervisors          : Community Banks; Conference of State Bank Supervisors         
b. OCC b. OCC
Mission Mission: Supervise National Banks and Strengthen their Charter : Supervise National Banks and Strengthen their Charter
Special Clientele Special Clientele: Money : Money- -Center and Regional Banks Center and Regional Banks
c. OTS c. OTS
Mission Mission: Support mortgage market (i.e., keep Basel risk weight for mort : Support mortgage market (i.e., keep Basel risk weight for mortgages low),  gages low), 
Strengthen S&L charter, and supervise  Strengthen S&L charter, and supervise S&Ls S&Ls
Special Clientele Special Clientele: S&Ls & Building Industry : S&Ls & Building Industry
III. Congress & Administration III. Congress & Administration
IV. Voter IV. Voter- -Taxpayers Taxpayers
 






Main Stakeholders in Europe
I. CHANGING MIX OF CENTRAL BANKS AND FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITIES
a. Mission of Central Banks: Stability of Every Kind
b. Mission of FSAs: Application of Basel Across Countries and 
Institution Types (Increased Supervisory Authority and Uniformity 
as well as Financial-Institution Stability)
c. IOSCO et al.
d. Clienteles: Systemically Important Institutions 
(Trend is for European central banks to transfer responsibility for 
fin. stability to FSAs and to apply the Basel approach to every kind 
of financial institution.)
II. ECB and Other Authorities in European Union
a. Mission: To promote political and economic integration (uniform 
rules)
b. Clientele: Sponsors of political and economic 
integration in Brussels and elsewhere. 
III. Elected Officials in National Governments
IV. Voter-Taxpayers






First First- -Order Stake of U.S. Negotiators Is Enhancing  Order Stake of U.S. Negotiators Is Enhancing 
Financial Stability Financial Stability; First ; First- -Order Stake of EU  Order Stake of EU 
Negotiators is Enhancing  Negotiators is Enhancing Financial Integration Financial Integration. .
Objective Function for  Objective Function for 
Regulators Regulators
¾ ¾ Mission Fulfillment Mission Fulfillment
¾ ¾ Reputational Reputational Standing of their  Standing of their 
Organization Organization
a. With clientele
b. With National Politicians
c. With Foreign Regulators
d. With Taxpayer-Voters
¾ ¾ Personal and Career  Personal and Career Benefits  Benefits 
for for Staff and Leaders Staff and Leaders
Objective Function for  Objective Function for 
Regulated Institutions Regulated Institutions
¾ ¾ Competitive Advantages,  Competitive Advantages, 
Including Loyalty of Clients and  Including Loyalty of Clients and 
Broader  Broader Reputational Reputational Standing  Standing 
of Firm of Firm
¾ ¾ Regulatory Forbearances Regulatory Forbearances
¾ ¾ Personal Rewards to Staff &  Personal Rewards to Staff & 
Leaders (Incentive Bonuses;  Leaders (Incentive Bonuses; 
Career Trophies and  Career Trophies and 
Opportunities)  Opportunities) 
 
 